Read Part 1 first.
It’s been nearly a week since I posted the first part of my review of this thought-provoking book, so I’m about due for the next installment. Briefly to recap, Legenhausen’s work on religious pluralism has converted me away from broad, reductive, Hick-type pluralism as a philosophical concept.
After defining various types of pluralism, Legenhausen then describes the philosophy of John Hick (probably pluralism’s most famous advocate) and gives a run-down of a series of responses to Hick’s thesis, in defense of non-pluralist positions. I have to say this bit was over my head. To give you an example:
Wild speculation that q on the basis of e is not a case of prima facie justification because e would not provide x with sufficient grounds for believing q even if there were no overriders in the possession of x.
Way too mathematical for me, so I kinda skipped over chunks of “The Epistemological Challenge of Religious Pluralism,” although I did manage to pick up the following.
Hick claims that if it is religious experience that makes religious belief rational, and all the various religions have experiences that can be said to justify their claims (eg. the Christian being baptised with the Holy Spirit, the Buddhist’s experience of Nirvana, the Muslim’s annihilation and subsistance in Allah
, glorified be He etc.) then religious experience either justifies all religions or none.
One response to the varying experiences that are had in the world’s religions, is to assert that there is no real underlying difference. That underneth all the religions is a mystical unity: Sufis, Kabbalists, Mystics Unite! However, experts on religious mysticism are increasingly rejecting this view, says Legenhausen, because it fails to understand that mystical experiences are strongly conditional upon the religious paradigm that produces them. To put it another way, there is a reason why St. John of the Cross experienced a relationship with Jesus and not the Buddha!
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